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PANZER V. DOYLE: WISCONSIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEALS THE
GOVERNOR A NEW HAND
I. INTRODUCTION
The fall elections of 2002 brought drastic changes to the Wisconsin
state capital. The race for governor had been close and contentious.1 It
resulted in the election of the first Democratic governor in sixteen years:
Governor James E. Doyle. The same election created a Republican
majority in the Wisconsin State Senate.' With the Republicans already
comfortably holding a majority in the assembly, this set the new
Democratic governor up against a Republican-dominated legislature.
Unfortunately, the tribal-state gaming compacts provided the first
opportunity for each side to flex its muscle.
Shortly after the inaugurations, news of the amended gaming
compacts spread.4 Governor Doyle and the tribes had agreed to
amendments that called for much larger payments to the State by the
tribes In exchange, the tribes would receive perpetual compacts that
allowed them to offer more games and included a partial waiver of the
State's sovereign immunity.6
1. See Steven Walters, Doyle Extends Hand to GOP; Governor-Elect Urges Bipartisan
Fix For Deficit, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1A (reporting that Governor-elect
Doyle defeated Governor McCallum by a forty-five percent to forty-one percent margin); Jim
Stingl, It's Just Another Playground Fight, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2002, at 1B
(commenting on the contentious nature of the gubernatorial campaign on the eve of the
election).
2. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 2003-2004
BLUE BOOK 695 (2003). According to his biography, Governor Doyle worked as an
"attorney for a federal legal services office on [the] Navajo Indian Reservation in Chinle,
AZ" from 1972 to 1975. Id. at 4.
3. Richard P. Jones, Recount Ends in Leibham's Favor; Victory Secures GOP's Hold on
State Senate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 27, 2002, at 1B (reporting that the senate
Republicans would have an eighteen to fifteen majority).
4. Dennis Chaptman, Lawmakers Want a Say in State Gaming Deals; Governor
Shouldn't Have Sole Authority, Some in GOP Say, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2003,
at lA.
5. Steve Schultze, Gaming's New Deal; Tentative Open-Ended Compact Has Oneida
Paying More to State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL 1, Feb. 20, 2003, at 1A.
6. Id.
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The legislature disapproved It quickly passed legislation that
would give it a role in the compacting process.8 However, Governor
Doyle vetoed the bill.9 The Republicans did not have large enough
majorities, or enough support from Democrats, to get the necessary
two-thirds vote to override a gubernatorial veto."°
After passing another bill, and again failing to override Governor
Doyle's veto, the Republican legislative leaders tried a new tactic: they
filed suit against Governor Doyle." In Panzer v. Doyle,"2 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that Governor Doyle exceeded his authority in
negotiating the amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi
Community of Wisconsin ("FCP") gaming compact. 3 Specifically, the
court held that the Governor lacked authority to (1) agree to perpetual
compacts, (2) waive the State's sovereign immunity, or (3) permit tribes
to offer games that are against the State's gambling public policy. 4
This Note clarifies what the likely impact of the Panzer decision will
be on future gaming compact negotiations and affirms that Wisconsin
law, not federal law, best addressed all of the questions presented to the
court. Part II of this note provides an overview of gaming in Wisconsin
and the series of events that led up to the legislators filing suit." Part III
explains the holdings of the court. 6 Part IV clarifies the likely impact of
7. See Steven Walters & Dennis Chaptman, Potawatomi Make Deal; Pact Allows 24-
Hour Betting, Nets State Extra $78 Million, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2003, at 1A
(reporting that Assembly Speaker John Gard said, "Gov. Doyle's action to announce a
sweetheart deal with the Potawatomi today is panicked, partisan and premature").
8. S.B. 41, 2003-05 Session (Wis. 2003).
9. Richard Jones, Doyle Tells GOP Leaders to Quit Playing Games; As He Pushes
Budget, They Say He's Diverting Focus From Casinos, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, March 6,
2003, at lB.
10. See id.
11. Dennis Chaptman, GOP Lawmakers to Sue Over Gaming Deal; Doyle Overstepped
Power, Leaders Say, Milw. J. Sentinel, April 2, 2003, at lB. At a press conference on the day
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 680 N.W.2d 666, Senate
Majority Leader Mary Panzer remarked, "I remember so clearly when Governor Doyle was
sworn in, [Chief Justice] Shirley Abrahamson said, jokingly, 'If there's ever a dispute, come to
me.' Well, we did that, and we have a decision, and now it's time to move forward." Gard-
Panzer: Decision Means Taxpayers will Get Fair Deal, May 25, 2004, http://www.wispolitics.c-
om/index.iml?Article=17321.
12. 2004 WI 52, 680 N.W.2d 666. The Wisconsin Supreme Court took the case as an
original action. Id.
13. Id. 113, 680 N.W.2d at 701.
14. Id. 5, 680 N.W.2d at 670.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
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the holdings. 7 Finally, Part V affirms the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate the questions raised in Panzer.8
II. THE CONTEXT OF PANZER V. DOYLE
To appreciate the Panzer court's holdings, it is necessary to
understand the legal framework that preceded the decision.
Accordingly, this part of the note will consider (A) the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), (B) the Wisconsin Legislature's initial
reaction to IGRA, (C) the 1992 gaming compacts, (D) the 1993
constitutional amendment, (E) the 1998 gaming compact amendments,
and (F) the 2003 gaming compact amendments.
A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In 1988, Congress passed IGRA in response to conflicts that had
arisen among tribes and states as tribes made efforts to establish gaming
operations. '9 IGRA created a framework to regulate certain forms of
reservation gaming.2 This included establishing three categories of
games, each having different regulatory characteristics. 21 Class I games
include social games for minimal values, which are typically associated
with tribal ceremonies and celebrations. Tribes exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over Class I games.23 Class II games include bingo, bingo-
type games, and certain non-banking card games. Tribes also have
jurisdiction over Class II games but must conform with any state
statutes related to the games.' Finally, Class III games are any games
not categorized as Class I or Class II games.26 Tribes may offer Class III
games on tribal land only if (1) the tribe passes an ordinance permitting
them, (2) the tribal land is located in a state that permits such gaming,
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 769, 770 (1995) (providing analysis of the political compromises that gave rise to
IGRA).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000).
21. § 2703.
22. § 2703(6).
23. § 2710(a)(1).
24. § 2703(7).
25. § 2710(a)(2).
26. § 2703(8).
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and (3) the tribe has entered into a compact with the state.27
Under IGRA, state involvement in Indian gaming is limited to
negotiating gaming compacts. IGRA provides the basic procedure for
the tribal-state compacting process.2 However, IGRA does not identify
who should negotiate on behalf of a state.29 IGRA also leaves unclear a
process for determining the specific forms of gaming activities the
parties must negotiate."
B. The Wisconsin Legislature's Reaction to IGRA
The Wisconsin Legislature responded to Congress's passing of
IGRA by passing legislation to make the governor the sole negotiator
with the tribes.3' This legislation became section 14.035 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, which states that "[t]he governor may, on behalf of
[the] state, enter into any compact that has been negotiated under 25
U.S.C. 2710(d) [of IGRA]. '32
The legislature's delegation of power to the governor occurred after
Attorney General Donald Hanaway issued an opinion related to
IGRA.33 The opinion clarified that the legislature had the responsibility
of establishing gaming policy for the State.' The opinion also suggested
that the legislature could address Indian gaming by repealing or
amending the State's gambling statutes, specifically chapter 945 and
chapter 565."5 Additionally, any authorization of new gambling could
apply to either the entire State or just Indian country.36
27. § 2710(d)(1).
28. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
29. § 2710(d).
30. See Kevin K. Washburn, Frontier Justice Symposium Article: Land & Water Law
Division: Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYo. L. REV. 427, 442 (2001) (arguing
that although Indian gaming has experienced large growth, it is still an industry full of
uncertainties).
31. WIS. STAT. § 14.035 (2003-04).
32. Id.
33. 79 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 14 (1990).
34. See id. at 32; see also Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, T 18, 680 N.W.2d at 674.
35. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 14, 30 (1990). In the opinion, Attorney General Hanaway
wrote, "should it choose to do so, the Legislature may authorize casino-type gambling in the
State of Wisconsin and, therefore, within Indian country, or just within Indian country.
Should it wish to do so, the Legislature need only enact appropriate repeals or modifications
to chapters 945 and 565." Id. Chapter 945 includes criminal laws related to gambling. Wis.
STAT. ch. 945 (2003-04). Chapter 565 includes laws addressing the State lottery. WIS. STAT.
ch. 545 (2001-02).
36. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 14, 30 (1990).
[89:221
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Rather than addressing Indian gaming in any of the ways suggested
by Hanaway, the legislature delegated its power to shape gaming policy
to the governor. Amendments to the bill, which would have required
the legislature to ratify the compacts agreed upon by the governor,
failed during the process of both houses of the legislature approving the
bill .37
C. The 1992 Gaming Compacts
The initial tribal-state compact negotiations in 1989 quickly ended
up in the federal courts.38 Attorney General Hanaway, whom Governor
Tommy G. Thompson directed to negotiate the compacts, believed that
many of the games the tribes had an interest in offering were beyond
the scope of the negotiations because they were illegal under State law.39
At the time of the negotiations, the Wisconsin Constitution specifically
authorized pari-mutuel wagering4" and a state-run lottery. Chapter 945• 41
criminalized other forms of gambling.
The tribes disagreed with Hanaway. Two of the tribes filed a claim
in federal court asserting that the State had failed to negotiate in good
faith.43 In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin," the court held that the State needed to include casino
games, video games, and slot machines in the negotiations, regardless of
37. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 19, 680 N.W.2d at 674.
38. DAN RITSCHE, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, THE EVOLUTION
OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN WISCONSIN, RESEARCH BULLETIN 00-1, 22 (May 2000).
39. 79 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 14, 27 (1990).
40. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1987). Voters approved the constitutional amendment
authorizing pari-mutuel on-track betting by a vote of 580,089 in favor and 529,729 against on
April 7, 1987. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1987-1988
BLUE BOOK 872 (1987).
41. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1987). Voters approved the constitutional amendment
authorizing a state-run lottery by a vote of 739,181 in favor and 391,942 against on April 7,
1987. WIs. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1987-1988 BLUE
BOOK 873 (1987). The Wisconsin lottery has a complex history, which is beyond the scope of
this note. For a synopsis of the history, see RITSCHE, supra note 38, at 10-14.
42. WIS. STAT. ch. 945 (2003-04). Chapter 945 includes a general bar on gambling,
which made it a class B misdemeanor to make a bet, enter a gambling establishment with the
intent to make a bet, or conduct a lottery. WIS. STAT. § 945.02.
43. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F.
Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991). Since Lac du Flambeau, the United States Supreme Court has
held that 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), which authorized a tribe to bring suit in federal court to
compel a state to negotiate in good faith toward the formulation of a tribal-state compact,
violates the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
44. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
2005] 225
MARQUETTE LA WREVIEW
what specific forms of gambling statutes prohibited."
In the months following the district court's ruling, the eleven
federally recognized tribes and the State agreed to compacts that
generally permitted tribes to operate blackjack, video poker, video slot
machines, electronic slot machines, and pull-tabs. 6 The compacts also
included clauses that permitted them to be extended for five years after
an initial five years, unless either side desired to negotiate further
amendments."
D. The 1993 Constitutional Amendment
In 1993, voters answered "yes" to the following ballot question that
related to a proposed constitutional amendment: "Shall article IV of the
constitution be revised to clarify that all forms of gambling are
prohibited except bingo, raffles, pari-mutuel on-track betting and the
current state-run lottery and to assure that the State will not conduct
prohibited forms of gambling as part of the state-run lottery?"
8
The purpose of the 1993 amendment was to prevent the lottery from
providing casino-style gambling.49 Campaigning occurred on both
sides.50  Then-Governor Tommy G. Thompson and then-Attorney
General Doyle made joint appearances urging a "yes" vote,
characterizing the ballot question as an opportunity to restrict the
expansion of gambling. 1  Conversely, tribes generally opposed the
ratification of the amendment because they feared it would jeopardize
their existing compacts.
5 2
On the same ballot, voters answered advisory referendum questions
related to riverboat gambling, casinos, video gambling, pari-mutuel on-
track betting, and the continuation of the lottery. 3 State residents
45. Id. at 482.
46. RITSCHE, supra note 38, at 23.
47. Id.
48. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1993-1994 BLUE
BOOK 884 (1993). The Wisconsin Constitution provides the process for amending it. Wis.
CONST. art. XII, § 2. First, both houses of the legislature must approve a proposed
amendment in two successive sessions. Id. Then, the legislature must submit the proposed
amendment to the people for approval. Id. If a majority of voters approve the proposal, it
becomes part of the constitution. Id.
49. RITSCHE, supra note 38, at 11.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Wis. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 48, at 886-89. The advisory
[89:221
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favored continuing the gambling in place but not expanding it.
E. The 1998 Gaming Compact Amendments
In late 1998 and early 1999, Governor Thompson and each of the
tribes signed amendments that renewed the compacts for another five
years. 4 These amendments did not include any new games.5 However,
the amendments to the FCP compact did allow the Tribe to start
operating blackjack tables and 800 more slot machines at its Milwaukee
location. 6
F. The 2003 Gaming Compact Amendments
Soon after Governor Doyle took office, news spread that various
tribes had reached tentative agreements with the State on amendments
to the gaming compacts. 7 This included news of the FCP amendments. 8
The compacts required tribes to make increased payments to the State,
which would play a large role in addressing the deficit facing the State.59
In exchange for the increased payments to the State, the FCP
referendum were as follows: Gambling Casinos on Excursion Vessels Advisory Referendum
(Ballot question: "Do you favor a law that would allow gambling casinos on excursion vessels
operating in this state on the Mississippi River, Lake Michigan and Lake Superior?"; rejected
April 6, 1993 by a vote of 465,432 for and 604,289 against), id. at 886; Restriction on
Gambling Casinos in the State Advisory Referendum (Ballot question: "Do you favor a
constitutional amendment that would restrict gambling casinos in this state?"; approved Apr.
6, 1993 by a vote of 646,827 for and 416,722 against), id. at 886-87; Video Poker and Other
Forms of Video Gambling Advisory Referendum (Ballot question: "Do you favor a law that
would allow video poker and other forms of video gambling in this state?"; rejected April 6,
1993 by a vote of 358,045 for and 702,864 against), id. at 887; Pari-Mutuel On-Track Betting
Advisory Referendum (Ballot question: "Do you favor continuing to allow pari-mutuel on-
track betting on races in this state, such as horse, dog and snowmobile?"; approved April 6,
1993 by a vote of 548,580 for and 507,403 against), id. at 888; State-Operated Lottery
Advisory Referendum (Ballot question: "Do you favor continuing to allow the state-operated
lottery?"; approved April 6, 1993 by a vote of 773,306 for and 287,585 against), id. at 889.
54. See RITSCHE, supra note 38, at 25-28.
55. Id.
56. Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992 (signed Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.doa.state.wi.u-
s/docsview2.asp?docid=2154.
57. Chaptman, supra note 4.
58. Walters & Chaptman, supra note 7.
59. Amy Rinard, If State Gives a Little, It Can Take More from Casinos, Tribes Say,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2003, at 1A (reporting that "Gov. Jim Doyle... proposed
increasing nearly fivefold-to a minimum of $237 million over two years-payments made to
the state by Indian tribes that operate casinos in Wisconsin").
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specifically would receive (1) more games, including keno, roulette,
craps, and non-house banked card games, (2) a perpetual compact, and
(3) a partial waiver of the State's sovereign immunity.6
The Wisconsin Legislature raised concerns about the amendments. 6,
Within hours of learning of the new compact terms, the legislature
called itself into an extraordinary session to pass Senate Bill 41.62 The
bill proposed the creation of section 14.035(2), which would have
required the governor to submit proposed compacts or compact
amendments to the legislature for its approval.63 Legislators introduced
Senate Bill 41 on February 20, 2003, and passed it through both houses
of the legislature the next day.6 The Governor vetoed it on February
28, 2003.65 The senate failed to override the Governor's veto on March
4, 2003.66 Senate Bill 41 went from cradle to grave in just twelve days.
The legislature next worked to enact Assembly Bill 144.67 This bill
also required legislative approval of compacts or compact
amendments.6 In addition, Assembly Bill 144 limited the length of any
compacts and prohibited "compact terms that in any way condition
which gaming activities may be conducted under the compact based on
gaming activities that are conducted in Canada." 69 Legislators added the
latter provision after discovering that a clause in the compact
amendments allowed tribes to offer games that casinos within a seventy-
five mile radius of Wisconsin's borders offered.7' Because the Canadian
border was within the seventy-five mile radius, legislators did not want a
foreign nation's gaming policies affecting Wisconsin's policies.7"
60. Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?doc-
id=2154 (last visited October 12, 2005).
61. Waiters & Chaptman, supra note 7.
62. Chaptman, supra note 4.
63. S.B. 41, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003).
64. History of S.B. 41, 2003-05 Sess. (Wis. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us-
/2003/data/SB41hst.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Dennis Chaptman, Assembly Approves New Tribal Gaming Bill; Lawmakers Would
Get Final Say on Long-Term Compacts, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2003, at 14A.
68. A.B. 144, 2003-05 Session (Wis. 2003).
69. Id.
70. Steve Schultze, Revisions to Gaming Compact in Works; Changes a Response to
GOP Suit; U.S. Decision on Deal Expected Today, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2003, at
2B (reporting that Senator Panzer said, "With the 75-mile rule, you basically let other states
and Canada affect what you do here").
71. Id.
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Legislators introduced Assembly Bill 144 on March 6, 2003.72 It passed
both houses of the legislature by March 13, 2003, and the Governor
vetoed it on March 18, 2003."3
After failing to override the Governor's veto, Senate Majority
Leader Mary Panzer and Assembly Speaker John Gard filed suit against
Governor Doyle for exceeding his authority in signing the FCP compact
amendments.74
III. PANZER V. DOYLE
In Panzer, the legislators claimed that the Governor acted
improperly in agreeing to the parts of the 2003 amendments that (1)
made the compacts perpetual, (2) waived the State's sovereign
immunity, and (3) expanded the forms of gaming the Tribe could offer.75
The court viewed the case as "present[ing] questions about the inherent
and delegated power of Wisconsin's governors to negotiate gaming
compacts with Indian tribes,"76 which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
"the right and duty to resolve."77 The court concluded that in signing
the 2003 amendments to the FCP compact, Governor Doyle (A)
usurped legislative power and (B) failed to faithfully execute the laws
prohibiting certain forms of gambling. Accordingly, the court held that
Governor Doyle lacked the authority to agree to provisions making
compacts perpetual, waiving sovereign immunity, or adding new forms
of games prohibited by State law.
A. The Governor's Usurpation of Legislative Power
The Panzer court held that Governor Doyle usurped legislative
power by (1) agreeing to a perpetual compact and (2) partially waiving
the State's sovereign immunity.78 The court applied separation of
powers analysis to both of these issues and determined that negotiating
compacts and waiving sovereign immunity constituted legislative
72. A.B. 144 Bill History, 2003-05 Sess. (Wis. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.w-
i.us/2003/data/AB144hst.html.
73. Id.
74. Chaptman, supra note 11.
75. Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 1 3,680 N.W.2d 666,670.
76. Id. 2, 680 N.W.2d at 670.
77. Id. 102 n.41, 680 N.W.2d at 698.
78. See id. 5, 680 N.W.2d at 670.
79. Id. J 47, 680 N.W.2d at 684.
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powers.
1. The Governor Lacks the Authority to Agree to Perpetual Compacts
The legislators claimed that Governor Doyle lacked the authority to
agree to terms that made the compact perpetual.8' The 2003
amendments stated the following: "This Compact shall continue in
effect until terminated by mutual agreement of the parties, or by a duly
adopted ordinance or resolution of the Tribe revoking the authority of
the Tribe to conduct Class III gaming upon its lands."82 This language
replaced a provision that allowed either party to not renew the compact
every five years.83 The Panzer court concluded that the legislature had
not granted the governor the authority to agree to this change."
The Panzer court reached its conclusion after deeming the
negotiation of gaming compacts under IGRA a legislative function.85
The legislature delegated its authority to negotiate gaming compacts
through section 14.035 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 6 Section 14.035
granted the governor the authority to negotiate on behalf of the State
over Indian gaming compacts.87 The Panzer court considered this a
constitutional delegation of legislative power.' Specifically, section
14.035 satisfied the nondelegation doctrine89  because safeguards
remained in place for the legislature to regain or curtail the governor's
80. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 64, 108,680 N.W.2d at 684, 699.
81. Id. 3, 680 N.W.2d at 670.
82. Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as amended, December 3, 1998, § XXV(B)
(signed Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docsview2.asp?docid=2155.
83. Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin
Gaming Compact of 1992, § XXV (B), 33-34 (signed Aug. 4, 1992), http://www.doa.state.wi.u-
s/docsview2.asp?docid=2153.
84. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 82, 680 N.W.2d at 692.
85. Id. T 64, 680 N.W.2d at 687-88.
86. WIS. STAT. §14.035 (2003-04).
87. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 1 52-54, 680 N.W.2d at 684-85.
88. Id. 72, 680 N.W.2d at 689.
89. Id. [ 52-54, 680 N.W.2d at 684-85. The nondelegation doctrine arises when a
branch delegates its power to another. Id. 52, 680 N.W.2d at 684. The nondelegation
doctrine provides that a branch may not delegate power to another branch to the point that
the other branch has too much power. Id. A lawful delegation of power establishes the
fundamentals, while allowing the other branch to oversee the details. Id. at 1 54, 680 N.W.2d
at 685. As a result, in analyzing delegations courts focus on (1) the nature of the delegated
power and (2) the presence of adequate safeguards. Id.
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power.9° The safeguards of section 14.035 include the legislature's
ability to (1) repeal it, (2) amend it, or (3) appeal to public opinion.9'
The Governor acted beyond the scope of his power by agreeing to
perpetual compacts because such a duration-or lack there of-
undercut the safeguards that kept section 14.035 constitutional under
the nondelegation doctrine.92
2. The Governor Lacks the Authority to Waive Sovereign Immunity
The legislators claimed that Governor Doyle lacked the authority to
waive the State's sovereign immunity.93 The 2003 amendments stated,
"The Tribe and the State expressly waive any and all sovereign
immunity with respect to any claim brought by the State or the Tribe to
enforce any provision of this Compact."" After the legislators filed suit,
the Governor and the Tribe agreed to a technical amendment. It read:
"The Tribe and the State, to the extent the State or the Tribe may do so
pursuant to law, expressly waive any and all sovereign immunity with
respect to any claim brought by the State or the Tribe to enforce any
provision of this compact."95  The Panzer court concluded that the
Governor had waived the State's sovereign immunity, even with the
technical amendment.96
Only the legislature has authority to waive the State's sovereign
immunity.97 Any delegation of this authority, through the designation of
an agent, must occur clearly and expressly.98 The court found no such
delegation.' Therefore, the court deemed the waiver of sovereign
immunity void because the Governor had exercised a legislative power
in violation of the separation of powers established by the Wisconsin
90. Id. 91 72, 680 N.W.2d at 689.
91. Id. 1 71, 680 N.W.2d at 689.
92. Id.
93. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, $ 3, 680 N.W.2d at 670.
94. Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as amended, December 3, 1998, § XXIII(C)
(signed Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=2155.
95. Technical Amendment to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin
and the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as amended, 6 (signed May 2003)
(emphasis added), http:www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=2157.
96. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, T 106, 680 N.W.2d at 699.
97. Id. 108, 680 N.W.2d at 699.
98. Id. 91 09, 680 N.W.2d at 699-700.
99. Id. 110, 680 N.W.2d at 700.
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Constitution."°
B. The Governor's Failure to Faithfully Execute Gambling Laws
The legislators claimed that the Governor agreed to games not
permitted under State law."1 The agreement reached by the Governor
and the Tribe authorized the Tribe to offer added variations on
blackjack, pari-mutuel wagering, electronic keno, and casino table
games, including roulette, craps, and poker. 102 The Panzer court held
that Governor Doyle acted contrary to public policy and without
authority when he agreed to the additional games. 3
For the court to properly determine whether the Governor
overstepped his authority in agreeing to new games, it needed to
understand the framework for compact negotiations established by
Congress in IGRA." Although IGRA establishes that tribes and states
should compact related to Class III gaming activity, the law does not
clearly identify the scope of negotiable games. The law states that
"Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such
activities are ... located in a State that permits such gaming for any
purpose by any person, organization, or entity."' 5  Courts have
interpreted this language when determining the scope of negotiable
games. ' °6 However, disagreement exists on the proper interpretation.
7
Some courts have interpreted it as making all forms of Class III games
negotiable if a state permits any form of Class III gaming."s Other
100. Id.
101. Id. 3, 680 N.W.2d at 670.
102. Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as amended, December 3, 1998, (signed Feb.
19, 2003), http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=2155.
103. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 5, 680 N.W.2d at 670. In Dairyland Greyhound Park v.
Doyle, 2005 WI 21, 693 N.W.2d 78 (petition by the court of appeals to certify granted), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court will address whether the compacts that allow the tribes to offer
games agreed to in the 1992 compacts, and continued based on the 1998 amendments, violate
article IV, section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
104. Id. 92, 680 N.W.2d at 695-96.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
106. See Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 92, 680 N.W.2d at 695-96 (citing Lac du Flambeau Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D. Wis. 1991));
see also Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
107. See id.; see also Washburn, supra note 30, at 442.
108. See Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486; see also Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. United States, 367 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004).
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courts have interpreted it as making negotiable only the forms of Class
III activities that a state permits.' 9
After considering interpretations by various federal courts, the
Panzer court concluded that IGRA created two categories of Class III
games: (1) mandatory subjects of negotiation and (2) illegal subjects of
negotiation.11" The Panzer court defined mandatory subjects of
negotiation as those forms of Class III gaming permitted by the State.111
Conversely, the Panzer court defined illegal subjects of negotiations in
terms of the State's public policy towards gambling. 2 Considering the
Wisconsin Constitution113 and criminal statutes, 4 the court concluded
that Wisconsin had a strong public policy against gambling."
Therefore, according to the Panzer court's interpretation of IGRA, it is
illegal for the State to negotiate with tribes over forms of gaming that
are either not authorized by the constitution or barred by criminal
statutes.1 6
The Panzer court rejected the notion that the only way to avoid
negotiations over all forms of Class III games would be to criminally
prohibit all forms of Class III games within the State. 7
After analyzing IGRA, the Panzer court concluded that the
Governor acted without authority when he agreed to games that were
illegal subjects of negotiation.18 The nonnegotiable games included the
variations on blackjack, electronic keno, and casino table games.'1 9 The
Governor's lack of authority to agree to these new games invalidated
that section of the compact.
109. See Rumsey, 99 F.3d at 322; see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 279.
110. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 91,680 N.W.2d at 695.
111. Id. For example, Wisconsin permits pari-mutuel wagering. Id. 97, 680 N.W.2d at
697. Therefore, pari-mutuel wagering is a mandatory subject of negotiation. See id. T 91, 680
N.W.2d at 695.
112. Id. 94, 680 N.W.2d at 696.
113. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24.
114. WIS. STAT. ch. 945.
115. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 94, 680 N.W.2d at 696.
116. Id. 97, 680 N.W.2d at 697.
117. Id. T 92, 680 N.W.2d at 695. The court's approach is inconsistent with Lac du
Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991). The Lac du Flambeau court held that
Wisconsin was required to negotiate over the inclusion in the tribal-state compact "any
activity that includes the elements of prize, chance and consideration and that is not
prohibited expressly by the Wisconsin Constitution or state law." Id at 488.
118. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 97, 680 N.W.2d at 697.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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IV. THE GOVERNOR'S NEW HAND FOR NEGOTIATING INDIAN
GAMING COMPACTS
Panzer affirms that for Indian gaming compact negotiations the
governor acts as the sole negotiator on behalf of the State of
Wisconsin. 121 But, the court also outlined the restrictions that Wisconsin
constitutional law places on his authority.2 According to the Panzer
holdings, when renegotiating the amendments to the gaming compacts,
the governor must (1) ensure the compacts retain a duration, (2) not
waive the State's sovereign immunity, and (3) negotiate over only games
permitted by the constitution and not prohibited by criminal statutes.'23
Seventeen months after the Panzer court ruled, Governor Doyle and
the FCP announced new amendments.'24 The 2005 amendments (1)
provided for nonrenewal by either party after twenty-five years, (2)
removed the language that constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity,
and (3) left unamended the section addressing the games the Tribe may
offer. 25  Within days, a petition had been filed with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to have the new 2005 amendments deemed
unconstitutional for failing to comply with Panzer, specifically related to
the games the Tribe would be allowed to continue to offer. 126 This part
of the note considers the meaning of the Panzer holdings, specifically
related to their impact on future negotiations and whether the new 2005
amendments comply with the holdings.
121. See id. 72, 680 N.W.2d at 689. The court deemed section 14.035 a constitutional
delegation of power. Id.
122. Id. 113, 680 N.W.2d at 701.
123. See id.
124. David Callender, Potawatomi to Pay State $43.6 Million; Pact Gives 8% of Casino
Profit, THE CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at 3A.
125. 2005 Amendment to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and
the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as Amended, (signed Oct. 4, 2005),
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=5275.
126. Patrick Marley, Dog Track Challenges New Casino Pact; Potawatomi Deal Still
Unconstitutional, Dairyland Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 12, 2005, at 3B (reporting
that the petition stated, "For the governor to ignore a Supreme Court decision that directly
invalidated his previous action regarding the scope of games in the (Potawatomi) compact is
stunning. It is a direct failure to faithfully adhere to Wisconsin law."). The petition was made
within the context of Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, 2004 WI 34, 677 N.W.2d 275
(petition by the Court of Appeals to Certify granted), which presents the question of whether
Indian casinos are unconstitutional because of the 1993 constitutional amendment that bars
casino-style gambling in Wisconsin. The court heard oral arguments in the case on
September 7, 2005, and had not yet ruled when Dairyland Greyhound Park made its petition
to deem the October 5, 2005, amendments unconstitutional.
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A. The Duration Must Keep the Nondelegation Doctrine
Safeguards Intact
The Panzer court did not specify an appropriate duration for Indian
gaming compacts.'" Some of the tribes' compact amendments included
a clause that made the duration ninety-nine years, if a court invalidated
the perpetual term.'2 Although the FCP amendments did not include
such a provision, the Tribe's Attorney General suggested that the Tribe
may seek a similar duration.19 Regardless of the specific duration, the
tribes desire long-term compacts that will allow them to secure long-
term financing for expansion.3 ' Additionally, long-term compacts
would insulate the tribes from political conflicts like the one
surrounding the 2003 amendments.
However, the nondelegation doctrine, and the requisite safeguards
that must remain intact, may prevent the tribes from getting long-term
compacts. The Panzer court suggested that the problem with perpetual
compacts would be that the legislature would lose its ability to alter the
State's position on Indian gaming by repealing or amending section
14.035.132 Additionally, the court criticized perpetual compacts for not
allowing a potentially disapproving electorate to elect a new governor
that would negotiate different compact terms. 3  Compacts lasting
ninety-nine years would present similar problems as perpetual
compacts. If future courts share the Panzer court's concerns, it seems
127. See Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 82, 680 N.W.2d at 692.
128. Second Amendment to the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin and the State of
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991, § 25, http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs -.view2.asp?docid=-
2150. The clause reads, "If the provisions [making the compact perpetual] are determined to
be invalid or unlawful by a court of competent jurisdiction, the term of this Compact shall
expire April 25, 2102." Id.
129. See Stacy Forster & Patrick Marley, State, Tribe Plan to Reopen Talks Soon;
Potawatomi May Seek 99-Year Gaming Compact; Republicans Urge Taking Bigger Cut of
Revenue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 15, 2004, at lB (reporting that the Doyle
Administration and Assembly Speaker Gard disagreed on the types of terms that should be
part of the gaming compacts).
130. Steve Schultze, Seven More Tribes Sign Gaming Compacts; Casino Deals Would be
Permanent, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 26, 2003, at IA.
131. Interview by Jeff Mayers with Jeff Crawford, Attorney General, Forest County
Potawatomi Tribe, in PLACE (June 7, 2004).
132. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, $ 79, 680 N.W.2d at 691. See also Forster & Marley, supra
note 129 (reporting that Speaker Gard said a ninety-nine year term for the FCP compact was
"way too long," and he commented that "[slometimes it seems like [the Doyle
Administration is] sitting on the wrong side of the negotiations. It seems like they're
advocating for the tribes and not advocating for the taxpayers.").
133. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, $ 79, 680 N.W.2d at 691.
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likely that a permissible duration would be closer to the five years
agreed upon in 1992, rather than ninety-nine years.
The 2005 amendments establish an initial duration of twenty-five
years for the compact. 4 If neither party serves the other with a notice
of nonrenewal within 180 days prior to the compact's expiration, the
compact will automatically renew.'35 For the State to serve notice, the
legislature must first pass a statute directing the governor to provide
such service.'36
As with any other statute, the governor could presumably veto one
passed by the legislature to direct him or her to serve notice. Therefore,
if the governor does not wish to serve notice, the legislature would need
a two-thirds vote in both houses of the legislature to override the
governor's veto before it could direct the governor to serve notice.
Considering that the legislature has not overridden a veto in two
decades,'37 the notice procedure provided by the amendment leaves the
power to renew the compacts mostly with the governor. This likely
would not raise a constitutional problem for a court applying Panzer.
The Panzer court itself concluded that the legislature's ability to amend
or repeal section 14.035, which would face the same veto threat,
constituted a safeguard in the context of the nondelegation doctrine.
Another nondelegation safeguard a court would need to consider
would be whether the legislature could effectively appeal to the
electorate with a twenty-five year compact duration. In this context, a
twenty-five year duration may raise a constitutional problem. Between
now and 2035, when the compacts would be up for renewal under the
2005 amendments, Wisconsin will have eight gubernatorial elections and
sixteen legislative elections. Under the pre-2003 amendments, which
had a five-year duration, there would usually be one gubernatorial
election and two legislative elections between renewals. The ability of
the electorate to act on any appeals by the legislature would be reduced
under the 2005 amendments when compared with the pre-2003
amendments. Whether the new twenty-five year duration stands up to
scrutiny will likely turn on a court's perception of what constitutes an
134. 2005 Amendment to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and
the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as Amended, (signed Oct. 4, 2005),
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=5275.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Stacy Forster & Steven Walters, 2nd Test Set Over Nursing Homes; Senate
Republicans Aim to Rebuff Doyle's Fee-Raise Veto Tuesday, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
September 22, 2005, at lB.
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effective appeal to the electorate.
B. The Governor May Not Waive Sovereign Immunity
The Panzer court made clear that the governor does not have
authority to waive the State's sovereign immunity.'38 Therefore, any
waiver in a compact amendment would require legislative involvement
in the negotiation process. Based on the technical amendment agreed
upon by the Governor and FCP, which purported to be a nonwaiver of
sovereign immunity, a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity does
not seem to rise to a level that would induce the Governor to get the
legislature involved in the negotiation process. The parties made this
even cleaner in the 2005 amendments by removing entirely the language
that the Panzer court deemed invalid.39
C. Amendments Must Keep New Games Limited to Pari-Mutuel
Wagering
Related to the scope of negotiable games, Panzer held that the
governor may negotiate over games permitted by the constitution and
not prohibited by the criminal statutes.40 This means that the governor
may not agree to the tribes offering variations of blackjack, keno,
roulette, craps, or poker.14 ' This leaves pari-mutuel wagering as the only
new game the governor may offer the tribes under current law. 42 Such a
limit on games the tribes may offer would substantially reduce the
potential revenue they can generate.
Under the 2005 amendments, the FCP would be able to offer the
same games it could under the 2003 amendments.'" The Panzer court
deemed that arrangement under the 2003 amendments
138. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 108, 680 N.W.2d at 699.
139. 2005 Amendment to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and
the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as Amended, (signed Oct. 4, 2005),
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docsyview2.asp?docid=5275.
140. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 97,680 N.W.2d at 697.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. George R. Lewis, Op-Ed, Ho-Chunk Will Pay When Tribe Has Compact, WtS. ST.
J., Feb. 6, 2005, at B2. George R. Lewis is president of the Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally
recognized tribe in Wisconsin.
144. 2005 Amendment to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and
the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as Amended, (signed Oct. 4, 2005),
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=5275.
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unconstitutional." 5 Considering that nothing has changed related to the
State's gambling laws since the Panzer ruling on the 2003 amendments,
a court applying Panzer would presumably find that portion of the
compact invalid again. However, the make-up of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has changed.'46 The influence of that change on Indian
gaming, if any, will be seen in future cases applying Panzer.
V. AN AFFIRMATION OF THE PANZER COURT'S JURISDICTION
Upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court releasing its Panzer decision,
the Governor suggested that federal courts would need to determine the
scope of negotiable games."' The tribes agreed."' The dissent itself
cautioned that "the issue of federal preemption [was] lurking."'4 9 The
dissent went so far as to conclude that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the legislators' claim related to the
scope of negotiable games.' Some political observers believe this
interpretation of the law is misguided and potentially undercuts the
precedential value of Panzer.5' This part of the note explains why
suggestions that federal law preempts State law in this instance are
145. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 97, 680 N.W.2d at 697.
146. Compare Associated Press, Sykes to Begin 10-Year Court Term: Election Secures
the Current Majority, DUBUQUE TELEGRAPH HERALD, Apr. 6, 2000, at 12A (reporting that
University of Wisconsin Political Science Professor Herbert Kritzer said, after Justice Sykes
won election to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2000, "her conservative views would align
her on the court with Justices Patrick Crooks, David Prosser and Jon Wilcox. Chief Justice
Shirley Abrahamson and Justices William Bablitch and Ann Walsh Bradley form the court's
more liberal voting block."), with Derrick Nunnally, Justice Urges Support of State Supreme
Court; Butler Rebuts Criticism That Judges Have Exceeded Their Authority, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 24, 2005, at 2B (reporting that Justice Bulter, who was appointed to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in August 2004 to replace Justice Sykes, addressed "[a] spate of
recent civil cases decided by the Supreme Court . . . [that] have drawn heavy fire from
conservatives").
147. Forster & Marley, supra note 129. See also Press Release, Office of Governor Jim
Doyle, Statement of Governor Doyle Regarding Indian Gaming Lawsuit (May 13, 2004) (on
file with author) ("The deeply divided Court... raised several specific questions about the
terms of the compacts. These questions must either be answered by a federal court-which is
likely considering that Indian gaming is covered by federal law, not state law-or through
further discussions with the Tribes.").
148. Forster & Marley, supra note 129.
149. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 236, 680 N.W.2d at 728.
150. Id. 91 250, 680 N.W.2d at 731.
151. See Richard Jones, High Court Revives Case Against Doyle; Authority to Negotiate
Gaming Deals Challenged, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 13, 2003, at 3B (reporting that
Speaker Gard said, "There's some very serious [Wisconsin] constitutional issues that should
be resolved by the court that resolves them, the state Supreme Court.").
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mistaken.
A. A Proper Appreciation of IRGA's Preemptive Force
IGRA preempts state law related to the regulation of Indian
gaming."2 It does not, however, preempt state law related to the
negotiation of tribal-state gaming compacts.153 Therefore, had the
Panzer court heeded the dissent's warning of lurking preemption, the
application of Wisconsin law would have been unnecessarily eliminated
from any consideration of the tribal-state compact negotiation process.
Federal courts agree that issues related to the negotiation process do
not fall within the scope of IGRA's complete preemption.15 In Gaming
Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney,55 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that IGRA completely preempts
state law related to the regulation of Indian gaming.156 The Gaming
Corp. of America court indicated that the preemptive force does not
preempt state law related to the negotiation of gaming compacts."'
Courts applying the Gaming Corp. of America holding have also found
that the compact negotiation process does not fall within the scope of
IGRA's preemptive force.' Absent IRGA's preemptive force, State
law has a role in determining questions related to the tribal-state
compact negotiation process. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit has found, since the holding in Gaming Corp. of
America, that state law applies in determining whether a state has
bound itself to a compact.
60
The Panzer dissent characterized the majority's holding that the
Governor exceeded his constitutional authority in agreeing to certain
new games as "miss[ing] the mark because it rests on an erroneous
assumption that states can directly regulate Indian gaming .... They
cannot. Under IGRA, state law can only indirectly affect Indian
152. See Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996); see
also Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir. 1997).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 544.
157. Id. at 547.
158. Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2001);
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 132 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (N.D. N.Y. 2000).
159. See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1557.
160. Id.
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gaming, and only through compact negotiations.''. Although an
accurate statement of IGRA's preemptive force, the assessment that the
majority missed the mark rests on its own assumption that the
legislators' claim constitutes direct regulation of Indian gaming. To
support its assumption, the dissent argued that because the Tribe and
State entered into a valid compact in 1992, the negotiations are over.
Adopting this approach, that IGRA completely preempts State law,
would have converted the legislators' claim into a federal question."' In
adjudicating the federal question, State law would have had no place.
The dissent's assumption that the legislators' claim is regulatory,'6
rather than as relating to the compact negotiation process, seems
erroneous. The dissent itself does not even consistently apply its own
characterization. Instead, it refers to the discussions between the
Governor and the tribes over the gaming compacts as "negotiations,' 6
and refers to the Governor's power to "negotiate."' 66 The dissent fails to
explain how the negotiation phase of the tribal-state relationship could
161 heend with the valid 1992 compact, yet the Governor still "negotiated"'
with the tribes over the 2003 amendments.
The Tribe and the Governor negotiated the 2003 amendments.
Accordingly, the legislators' claim does not fall within the scope of
161. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 237, 680 N.W.2d at 728-29.
162. Id. 208, 680 N.W.2d at 722.
163. See generally Black's Law Dictionary 303 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the complete-
preemption doctrine as "[t]he rule that a federal statute's preemptive force may be so
extraordinary and all-encompassing that it converts an ordinary state-common-law complaint
into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded-complaint rule").
164. Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 1 236-37, 680 N.W.2d 666, 728-29.
165. Id. 182, 680 N.W.2d at 715-16 (discussing the oversight role the legislature would
have in the "negotiation process" under proposed legislation); id. T 237, 680 N.W.2d at 728-29
(concluding that IGRA limits state law influence to the "negotiation process"); id. 262, 680
N.W.2d at 733 (suggesting that a provision in the compact allows the tribes to demand a
"renegotiation").
166. Id. 122, 680 N.W.2d at 703 (questioning why Governor Doyle could not
constitutionally "negotiate" the 2003 amendment); id. 155, 680 N.W.2d at 712 (stating that
current law allows the governor to "negotiate" the best terms); id. 160, 680 N.W.2d at 713
(suggesting the practicalities of "negotiating" that must be considered); id. 207, 680 N.W.2d
at 722 (arguing that any Class III games could be "negotiated" for between a tribe and state);
id. T 221, 680 N.W.2d at 725 (concluding that the parties intended to have continuing
agreements, subject to "negotiated" amendments).
167. Id. 208, 680 N.W.2d at 722 (The dissent wrote, "In American Greyhound Racing,
Inc. v. Hull, the district court noted that 'IGRA preemption blocks the operation of state
policy once a valid compact is executed, but it gives effect to state public policy through the
compact negotiation process.' Because the State and Tribe entered into a valid compact in
1992, their agreement is insulated from further changes in Wisconsin's gaming laws.").
168. See id. 1 207, 680 N.W.2d at 722.
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IGRA's complete preemption. The Panzer court correctly applied
Wisconsin law in adjudicating the legislators' claim related to the scope
of negotiable games.
B. The Panzer Court's Competence to Adjudicate Federal Questions
Even assuming, arguendo, that IGRA's preemptive force applied,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court would still have jurisdiction to adjudicate
the legislators' claim related to negotiable games.6 9 The United States
Supreme Court has long held that under the United States federal
system "'if exclusive jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own
constitution, they are competent to take it."".70  IGRA does not
expressly or implicitly grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction."'
An examination of the text of IGRA demonstrates a lack of an
express grant of exclusive jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) of
IGRA states that "It]he United States district courts shall have
jurisdiction.' 72 A comparison of this text to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,73 which
addresses federal questions, and 28 U.S.C. § 1334,' which address
bankruptcy cases, indicates that Congress did not expressly grant federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over tribal-state compacts, neither their
negotiation nor their regulation. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 states, "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' ' 75 State courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over § 1331 claims. Conversely, § 1334 provides
an example of Congress granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.76
Section 1334 states, "the district courts shall have original and exclusive
169. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,458 (1990).
170. Id. (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876)). The Tafflin Court
wrote, "We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations
imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have
consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States." Claflin, 493
U.S. at 548.
171. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(7)(A) (2000).
172. Id.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
175. § 1331 (emphasis added).
176. § 1334.
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jurisdiction of all cases under title .1.,' 17 The IGRA grant of jurisdiction
mirrors the nonexclusive grant in § 1331, as compared to the exclusive
grant in § 1334.
An examination of other jurisdictional grants by Congress related to
Indian affairs indicates a lack of any implied grant of exclusive
jurisdiction. Congress knows how to grant exclusive jurisdiction related
to Indian gaming, as illustrated by 18 U.S.C. § 1166.178 The statute
states, "The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws. . .. ,,17' This exclusive
grant of jurisdiction clearly does not extend to claims over compact
negotiations. Congress has also chosen not to grant exclusive
jurisdiction in other statutes related to Indian affairs.' 8° As the statutes
illustrate, Congress appreciates how to grant exclusive jurisdiction,
rather then concurrent jurisdiction, and has not done so related to
tribal-state compacts.
Nevertheless, the dissent stated that IGRA "contemplates actions
only in federal-not state-courts."'8' Coupled with the dissent's
statement that the Panzer court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
legislators' claim,"" this indicates that the dissent implied that IGRA
granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.
This is unpersuasive. The Panzer dissent relies on the findings of
federal courts that discussed IGRA's preemptive force related to
regulating Indian gaming.83 As indicated above, federal courts agree
that the regulation of gaming falls within IGRA's preemptive force.'
The federal courts, however, also agree that the negotiation of gaming
compacts does not fall within IGRA's preemptive force.8 5 The dissent
seemingly bases its implication that IGRA granted exclusive jurisdiction
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2000).
179. Id.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000) states that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Additionally,
28 U.S.C. §1362 (2000) states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by
the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
181. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 242, 680 N.W.2d at 729.
182. Id. T 250, 680 N.W.2d at 731.
183. Id. TT 239-243, 680 N.W.2d at 729-30.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 154-160.
185. Id.
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on its overly broad assumption related to the scope of IGRA's
preemptive force.
Absent Congress granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, state
courts have a duty to adjudicate federal questions raised.'86
Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that IGRA's preemptive force
applied to compact negotiations, the Panzer court would not only still
have jurisdiction to adjudicate the legislators' claim related to
negotiable games, but would have a duty to do so.
C. Supremacy of Federal Law, Not Supremacy of All Federal Courts
The only federal court decisions that have preemptive force are
those decided by the United States Supreme Court."8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recognized that its
opinions, and those of the district courts within it, do not bind state
courts.88
The dissent argued that the Panzer court lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate the legislators' negotiable games claim because a federal
court had already resolved the scope of negotiable games. In Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, the
court held that Wisconsin was required to negotiate over "any activity
186. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) ("Federal law is enforceable in state
courts not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened
or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum-although both might well be
true-but because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the
States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws 'the
supreme Law of the Land,' and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to
enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure").
187. See generally Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The
Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. REv. 703, 742 (1995) (writing, "When a state court decides
federal issues, it owes no fealty to the inferior federal courts in its region, including the local
court of appeals. State trial courts owe obedience on federal issues only to the higher state
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.").
188. See Smith v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1139 n.10
(7th Cir. 1994) ("While we might expect our exposition of federal constitutional law to inform
a state court decision addressing the point, our decision does not bind the Wisconsin state
courts. See also Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that the Supremacy
Clause does not require Illinois Courts to follow Seventh Circuit precedent)").
189. Id. 202, 680 N.W.2d at 720-21 (recognizing that in Forest County Potawatomi
Community v. Norquist, 45 F.3d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir. 1995), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that whether the State of Wisconsin permitted Class
III gaming, as required by 25 U.S.C. 2710 (d)(1)(B), is resolved by (1) the Lac du Flambeau
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991),
holding and (2) the existence of compacts between the tribes and the State).
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that includes the elements of prize, chance and consideration and that is
not prohibited expressly by the Wisconsin Constitution or State law.""
According to the dissent, this holding, coupled with the 1992 law-of-the-
compact clause, 9' clearly established the scope of negotiable games as
long as the compact continued."" The dissent went so far as to argue
that the federal district court's decision actually limited the Panzer
court's jurisdiction. 193
Although Lac du Flambeau could have been persuasive authority for
the Panzer court, its holding would not strip the court of its jurisdiction.
The Panzer court correctly adjudicated the legislators' claim, with a
proper deference to the federal courts.
In sum, the Governor and the dissent made misguided comments
about the "lurking" preemption in Panzer. Appreciating that the
Panzer court had jurisdiction to adjudicate all of the legislators' claims
has importance when future courts weigh the precedential value of
Panzer. Based on the court's jurisdiction, and our federalist system, it
has the weight of any other Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that
resolved claims raising separation of power issues in the context of the
Wisconsin Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Panzer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly addressed
separation of powers issues raised by the legislators. Contrary to the
Governor's comments and the dissent, nothing about IGRA allowed the
Governor to act as an extra-constitutional agent for the State. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly held that the Governor abused his
delegated authority and failed to faithfully execute State law.
Accordingly, if courts follow Panzer, future Wisconsin governors should
190. Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. 480.
191. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 1 194, 680 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting Forest County Potawatomi
Community of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, § XXVI (signed
Aug. 4, 1992), http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs view2.asp?docid=2153).
192. Id. T 205,680 N.W.2d at 721.
193. See id. $I 239-40, 680 N.W.2d at 729. The dissent stated:
[T]he question in this case concerning the permissible scope of gaming is
the same one addressed in Lac du Flambeau, as well as numerous federal
court cases .... Instead of recognizing this limitation to its jurisdiction,
however, the majority proceeds to analyze IGRA, going so far as to call
Lac du Flambeau's holding into doubt.
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negotiate amendments to gaming compacts that include a finite
duration, do not waive the State's sovereign immunity, and permit tribes
to offer only those games allowed by State law.
Wisconsin has had a long and turbulent history with gambling. Had
the 2003 amendments to the Indian gaming compacts been valid, they
would have likely put the issue to rest. The tribes would have had a
near monopoly over gambling in perpetuity. Yet Panzer has made it
likely that the simmering public policy debate over gambling and Indian
gaming in Wisconsin will continue for generations to come.
Fortunately, the Panzer court has provided a clear constitutional
framework for the process.
JAMES J. WAWRZYN
* * *
